First published in 1948, the International Social Security Review is the principal international quarterly publication in the field of social security.
Studies on the social protection of platform workers in Spain have focused on the bike couriers (or “riders”) who deliver meals to customers’ homes and whose services are used by some of the best-known platforms on the country’s social and economic scene. Most of these workers are covered by the social security scheme for self-employed workers. However, a Supreme Court ruling issued on 25 September 2020 reclassified the relationship between Glovo and its couriers as a contract of employment. This decision has changed the outlook for platforms and prompted the Spanish Government to regulate platform work in Spain. Nonetheless, the government ruling is limited to couriers, whereas, in reality, the issue is much broader. In this article, we look at the current reality of Spain’s platform workers vis-à-vis the social security system and the latest court rulings.
In the Netherlands, the social security rights of platform workers have still not been formally defined. At present, the level of social security protection accorded to all workers is derived directly from the labour law qualification. In the continuing absence in the Netherlands of specific legislation for platform workers, specifically as regards labour law and social security law, the existing legislation is steering. This means that the platform worker is either included using the status of employee with the corresponding extensive protection package, or the status of self-employed with limited social protection. For the majority of platform workers, this second option is applied to date. Nevertheless, recent developments point to possible improvements in the social security position of platform workers in the Netherlands.
This article compares social security coverage for the self-employed and for employees on digital platforms in Switzerland. It sheds light on the particularities that have acted to slow down the evolution of Swiss social legislation to the new emerging forms of work, and summarizes the solutions provided by case law. These solutions are still being fine-tuned, but lean towards the reclassification of contracts as salaried work. Finally, despite the hesitance of the Swiss authorities to take political steps to encourage these new forms of work, which offer significant economic potential, and while also seeking to prevent the risk of precarity in work, we discuss the options available.
In a changing world of work, platform workers struggle to gain adequate protection, and effective access to the benefits provided by the social security system form a part of this. Social security benefits in Romania are particular in that access is based on a person having a professional income, regardless of the legal status of the worker (subordinate or self-employed). As a rule, all workers are covered in the event of illness and changing family circumstances as well as for pensions. In contrast, coverage for self-employed workers for unemployment benefits, workplace injury and occupational disease benefits, paid leave in the event of illness, protection against the risks related to pregnancy or to care for a sick child is voluntary. Given the diffusion of platform work, the article addresses the specific situation of platform workers in Romania, formally covered by the social security system, but who face obstacles related to eligibility criteria, administrative formalities, the risk of the automatic termination of work and intermittent work patterns.
Platform work confronts traditional social security law in two dimensions. First, it makes the distinction between dependent and independent work uncertain and unclear, as the borderlines between these blur. This is a profound challenge for social security law, because the criteria of dependent and independent work have to be precise. In the determination of work as dependent or independent, German law illustrates that a shift has taken place in determining employment status, moving from external and objective criteria to the contracting parties’ decision, which is to be executed under private law, but also respected under social security law. Second, platform work is heavily intertwined with digital communication, which has established a global environment for communication. Thereby, platform work can also facilitate international trade by making transnational work more accessible and efficient. Therefore, it seems necessary to examine the implications of platform work in international law. International law makes possible the choice of law, executed by the contracting parties. As a consequence, the protection of employees by social security law is related to the private law arrangements between the service provider and the service recipient. Gaps in social security protection of service providers are widespread. In many countries, awareness of the social protection deficits of platform workers has grown and responses to improve the social status of platform workers have come under scrutiny. Analysis reveals that there is a joint responsibility of the service provider and the service recipient to be bound to social security coverage under the same national legislation. Nevertheless, from an international law perspective, it is shown that reforms are confronted with restrictions under international law.
Are online platform “workers” in Denmark effectively and adequately protected against social and labour market risks? This article discusses this fundamental issue in the context of the Danish labour market, which is known for having high levels of job insecurity but a rather generous social security system. The article finds that the Danish statutory social security system provides a necessary cushion against risk, but also identifies gaps in protection, which brings into question the system’s effective coverage and the adequacy of benefits.
This article highlights the debate on social security regimes applicable to platform workers in Italy. As social security regimes differ according to the type of employment or self-employment relationship, Italian case law dealing with platform workers’ employment status will be illustrated. Italian legislation, case law and collective bargaining on health and safety at work will then be presented, clarifying the coverage to which platform workers are entitled in the event of accidents at work and occupational diseases, with a focus on the COVID-19 pandemic impact. In turn, the two main Italian minimum income schemes and the related scholarly debate will be outlined, as well as their impact on the ability of digital labour platforms to avoid their responsibilities as regards workers’ rights, including access to adequate social protection.
This special issue of the International Social Security Review addresses the important topic of social protection for digital platform workers in Europe. The special issue highlights the risk that social protection systems may be largely undermined by a decline in social solidarity in favour of individualism, the partial or full privatization of social security, and a reduction in protection levels, all as a result of the emergence of digital platforms and the support they receive from legislators in most countries.
Addressing the social protection of platform workers, the French legislator in 2016 and then in 2019 made moves to incorporate these workers into the general social security regime with regard to certain covered risks (work injury and occupational diseases), and to improve adequacy (enabling possible access to complementary coverage). However, these moves rest on radically opposed perspectives. Rather than reasserting the legal responsibility of the employer vis-à-vis workers’ health and safety, we see responsibility placed with the platform, but only on a voluntary basis under the aegis of corporate social responsibility. This risks fragmenting social benefits, to be determined by each platform, thus weakening the practices of mutual protection and risk pooling among enterprises and workers that lie at the heart of social security. In doing so, the legislator has broken the link that had as its historic objective the goal of social inclusion and has encouraged in different ways the privatization, or a re-commodification, of social security in the commercial interest of private insurance companies. Moreover, this has been done using the Trojan Horse of the French labour code. This approach is in contrast to the converging position of international organizations, such as the European Union, International Labour Organization or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, recommending that States establish a right to social protection for all atypical workers and non-salaried workers. Instead of identifying the common challenges that face workers who work for platforms, and offering responses specific to their situation, rather, it considers platform work as one of the new forms of atypical work undertaken by those who may have the status of employee or self-employed.
The right to social security is enshrined in article 23 of the Belgian Constitution. It is the role of the legislator to implement it, to guarantee the right of all to lead a life in accordance with human dignity. Studies show that platform workers face major difficulties in terms of social protection. The aim of this article is to highlight the limits of existing legislative provisions regarding their ability to implement the fundamental right to social security for platform workers. With regard to these legislative provisions, we are interested in both the general regulations that shape the Belgian social security system and the recent measures adopted by the Belgian legislator with regard to the so-called sharing economy. An analysis of these provisions reveals that a number of platform workers are excluded from social security, both de facto and de jure. At the very least, this raises the question of whether the Belgian legislator is complying with the positive obligation to fulfil the constitutional right to social security for platform workers, and the negative obligation, at least, not to undermine it.
In 1998, the left‐of‐centre government of Hungary carved out a second‐pillar mandatory private pension scheme from the original mono‐pillar public system. Participation in the two‐pillar system was optional for those who were already working, but mandatory for new entrants to the workforce. About 50 per cent of the workforce joined the second pillar voluntarily and another 25 per cent were mandated to do so by law between 1999 and 2010. The second pillar has not improved the financial stability of the social security system. Moreover, the international financial and economic crisis has highlighted the transition costs that are associated with moving, even if only partially, to a system of pre‐funding. In 2010, the conservative government de facto “nationalized” the second pillar, and it is to use part of the accumulated pension capital to reduce Hungary's excessive public debt and annual budget deficit and to compensate for income tax reductions.
From 1981 to 2007, more than thirty countries worldwide fully or partially replaced their pre‐existing pay‐as‐you‐go pension systems with ones based on individual, private savings accounts in a process often labelled “pension privatization”. After the global financial crisis, this trend was put on hold for economic, ideational, and institutional reasons, despite a rise in critical indebtedness that has facilitated pension privatization in the past. Is the global trend towards pension privatization dead or in the process of being reborn, perhaps in a somewhat different form? Several recent trends point to rebirth as policy‐makers scale back public and private pension systems, attend to minimum pensions and “nudge” rather than mandate people to save for retirement.
The returns from individual account pension plans are subject to fluctuations in capital markets. This increases income uncertainty for the beneficiary and exposes individuals to the risk of fluctuations in the economy in general and the stock market in particular. A minimum pension guarantee is a way to avoid this pitfall by providing a minimum annuity regardless of the actual investment performance of individual accounts. In this article, we present a cost analysis of a minimum benefit guarantee mechanism for the voluntary Individual Pension System in Turkey. We examine the cost estimates and the probability of providing guaranteed payments under various economic and demographic assumptions.
A frequently used indicator to measure social health protection performance is the extent of population coverage as stipulated in national legislation. However, this indicator does not provide meaningful information on performance in terms of effective access to benefits that are available, affordable and of acceptable quality, not least for the poor and workers in informal economies. This article proposes a new approach to measuring performance by applying a set of relevant indicators in an analytical framework for assessing the performance of social health protection. The approach allows policy‐makers to conclude from comparisons among groups of countries facing similar challenges. Preliminary results include comprehensive information on deficits that need to be addressed when striving for effective universal coverage. With further refinement, the suggested approach could become a standard assessment tool for measuring performance.
This article examines a sample of employer programmes in sub‐Saharan Africa that supplement government efforts to prevent and treat human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Some of these programmes provide workers with in‐house education, voluntary HIV testing and antiretroviral treatment. Others rely on new forms of employment‐based group health insurance that include an HIV treatment package. In addition, some enterprises use the workplace as a platform for launching efforts into neighbouring communities to reach spouses, children, sex workers, secondary school students and others. Early evidence suggests that employer programmes maintain the health of large fractions of workers living with HIV who are served by them. They further enable enterprises to avoid productivity losses and turnover costs associated with HIV. At the same time, they take pressure off government agencies that face demands for treatment far exceeding their capacity. The article identifies features of successful employer programmes including “elite appeal”, which mobilizes community leaders and role models to deconstruct stigma, change perceptions and call for behavioural change; and “collateral linkage”, which extends the reach of HIV workplace programmes by linking them to related community concerns: e.g. alcohol abuse, malaria and domestic violence. Looking forward, the potential for expanding employer programmes as well as the restrictions associated with the limited scale of formal‐sector employment within sub‐Saharan African economies is assessed. Actions by which governments, employer associations, trade unions and international organizations can encourage further development of such programmes and extend their reach are suggested.